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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE WAGNER ACT
AND THE TAFT-HARTLEY BILL
T HE purpose of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947
(the Taft-Hartley Bill), is declared by Congress to be the
promotion of the full flow of commerce, "to prescribe the legiti-
mate rights of both employers and employees in their relations
affecting commerce,"' to provide procedure for the maintenance
of these rights and the rights of individual employees in their
relations with labor organizations, and to protect the national
interest in industries which are in or affect interstate commerce.
This declaration is a clear-cut departure from the underlying
philosophy of previous legislation, as embodied in the Wagner
Act 3 Although the basic purpose of both acts is the protection
of the free flow of commerce, the Wagner Act was directed solely
to protection of employees and labor organizations,' while the
present Act, retaining most of the provisions of the earlier law,
undertakes to guarantee, also, the protection of employer-rights
and the rights of individual employees to be free from oppres-
sion by the unions themselves. This is a fundamental change in
legislative attitude, inasmuch as it clearly demonstrates a con-
gressional belief that certain evils have developed as a result of
the practices of some unions and their officers. Hence a deter-
mined effort is made to place the three parties involved, unions,
employers, and employees, on an equal plane.
In order to accomplish this adjustment Congress believed it
necessary to make drastic amendments to the Wagner Act' and
I Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, § 1(b), 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A.
J 141(b) (Supp. 1947).
2 Ibid.
' National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. J§ 151-166
(1947).
4 Id, § 1.
5 LMRA 1 101.
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to enact many additional provisions. The more important of these
additions and changes, their underlying history and causes, Board
and court decisions under them, and their possible future effect
will be briefly examined here. Because of limited space those
sections of the Wagner Act which were re-enacted without change
are not discussed, and only passing attention is given to adminis-
trative and procedural alterations, since those provisions dealing
with substantive effect are thought to be of more general interest.
THE AMENDED NLRB
The Findings and Policy set out by the Amended Act are iden-
tical with those contained in the original, with one important
addition: it is stated that "certain practices of some labor organ-
izations" have prevented and burdened the free flow of commerce
and therefore necessity for the elimination of such practices exists.
Section 2 is devoted to the definition of some essential terms,
and several important amendments are made here. A considera-
tion of these changes is necessary because of their effect upon
other salient parts of the Act.
Person. This term is now defined to include "labor organiza-
tions," which were unmentioned in the original definition. Thus
a basis is provided for the issuance of NLRB orders to unions.
Such an extension of the term was required because, by Section
10 (c), NLRB orders are to be directed to "persons" who have
violated the Act.
Employer. Employer was formerly defined as "any person act-
ing in the interest of an employer." This is changed to read "any
person acting as an ageat of an employer." The House Commit-
tee explains the purpose of this change:
"1... to make employers responsible for what people say or do only
when it is within the actual or apparent scope of their authority, and
thereby make the ordinary rules of agency equally applicable to em-
ployers and unions."'
6 H. R. REP. No. 245, 80h Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1937).
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The Committee said that this was necessary because formerly
the Board
"... frequently 'imputed' to employers anything that anyone con-
nected with an employer, no matter how remotely, said or did, notwith-
standing that the employer has not authorized the action and in many
cases had even prohibited it. By such ruling the Board was often able
to punish employers for things they did not do, did not authorize, and
had tried to prevent."'7
Employee. The new act amends the old definition so as to ex-
clude from the term "employee" those individuals having the
status of independent contractor or supervisor, and those work-
ing for employers subject to the Railway Labor Act or for any
other person not an employer as defined by Section 2 (3). Here
the draftsmen sought to establish a legislative intent that the
ordinary meanings of words be used and to preclude the use of
"new meanings.., the Labor Board might think up." The House
Committee stated:
"Congress... intends ... that the Board give to words not far-
fetched meanings but ordinary meanings. To correct what the Board
has done, and what the Supreme Court, putting misplaced reliance
upon the Board's expertness, has approved, the bill excludes 'inde-
pendent contractors'...,,s
In connection with this statement the Committee cited a case'
wherein the Board held that "independent merchants who bought
newspapers from the publisher and hired people to sell
them . l0 were employees. Here the Congress showed a strong
disapproval of the practice of the Supreme Court in relying upon
the Board's assumed "expertness" in upholding decisions. This
criticism appears repeatedly throughout the reports of both the
Senate and House Committees.
Another impact of this amendment is the exclusion of super-
visors from the definition of "employee." Supervisory personnel
I Ibid.
Ibid.
SN. L . B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944).
10 See note 6 supra at 18.
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are not hereby precluded from joining unions-they are merely
removed from the operation of the Act. Employers may now rec-
ognize and bargain with, or merely ignore, supervisory unions,
as they choose. Since passage of the Taft-Hartley Act the Board
and courts have held that supervisors are not employees under
the Act' and that foremen are supervisors and therefore not em-
ployees." Supervisory unions had complained of employer re-
fusal to bargain, occurring before passage of the Act. Both the
Court and the NLRB held that in cases pending review at the time
of amendment the new definition of "employee" governs. Since
the complaint concerned nothing more than refusal to bargain, it
would not effectuate the policies of the Act to require the em-
ployer to take remedial action. Following this authority the Board,
on October 14, 1947, in six other almost identical cases, declared
supervisory employees outside the coverage of the NLRA as
amended and dismissed the complaints."
Under these decisions it seems settled that complaints filed
since the passage or effective date of the new Act, complaining of
practices occurring prior to those dates, will be decided on the
basis of the amended Act. These decisions indicate that both the
NLRB and the Courts are adopting a statutory construction calcu-
lated to effectuate the policy set forth by Congress in the Taft-
Hartley Law.
Supervisor. Section 2 (11) defines "supervisor," which was
not included in the old NLRA. The addition was made because
11 Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates v. N. L. R. B., 162 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A. 6th, 1947) ;
Westinghouse Electric Corp., Foremen's Assn. of America, Chapter No. 215, 75 N. L. R.
B., No. 1 (1947).
12 Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. N. L R. B., 163 F. (2d) 905 (APP. D. C. 1947).
13 Aluminum Co. of America, Foremen's Assn. of America (Independent) Chapter
No. 254, 75 N. L. R. B., No. 3 (1947) ; Columbia Steel Co., Foremen and Supervisor's
Assn. of Pittsburg, Calif., 75 N. L. R. B., No. 4 (1947) ; M. P. Mailer, Inc., Federal Labor
Union Local No. 23,985 (AFL), 75 N. L. R. B., No. 5 (1947) ; Peoples Life Ins. Co. of
Washington, D. C., American Federation of Insurance Supervisors Union No. 23,891
(AFL), 75 N. L. R. B. No. 6 (1947); Tidewater Associated Oil Co., United Petroleum
Workers (Unaffiliated), 75 N. L. R. B. No. 7 (1947) ; White Motor Co., Foremen's Assn.
of America (Independent) Chapter 102, 75 N. L. R. B., No. 8 (1947).
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of the exclusion of supervisors from the definition of "employee."
A supervisor is defined as follows:
"Any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action,
if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not
merely of a routine nature, but requires the use of independent judg-
ment." 1"
The Senate Committee was explicit as to the purpose of exclud-
ing supervisors. It stated that the Board, after changing its views
several times, had finally decided that supervisory employees
were subject to the NLRA; that this decision was upheld by the
Supreme Court; that a continuation of this policy was folly; that
"unless this Congress takes action, management will be deprived
of the undivided loyalty of its foreman."'" As illustration of this
"folly" the committee cited N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
C orp. 16 wherein testimony was given to the effect that after or-
ganization of supervisory employees the number of disciplinary
slips issued by supervisors in mines had fallen to one-third of
their previous volume and the accident rate had doubled. A fur-
ther declared purpose was termination of
"... the successful efforts of labor organizations to invoke the Wag-
ner Act for covering supervisory personnel, traditionally regarded as
part of management, into oraniations composed of or subservient to
the unions of the very men they were hired to supervise."T
Under this section the NLRB has rendered one decision, in
which it held that stewards on ships sailing the Great Lakes, who
were in general charge of galley crews and who had authority
to hire, discharge, discipline and give work assignments, were
supervisors and were excluded from coverage of the new Act.1 '
14 LMR 12(11).
1 Si. REP. No. 105, 0th Cong., Ist Sesa., 3-5 (1947).
171 N. L R. B. 1261 (1945).
It See note 15 supra at S.
U Kiunman Transit Co., Seafarer's International Union of North America, re
Lakes District (AFL), 75 N. L I B. No..16 (1947).
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Agency. The new Act states that, in determining whether one
person acted as agent for another, the question of whether acts
performed were authorized or ratified "shall not be controlling."
There was no reference to an agency test in the old NLRA. The
purpose of this new provision is to render employers and unions
liable for the acts of those persons who ordinarily commit un-
fair labor practices---supervisory personnel in the case of em-
ployers and organizers and union officers in the case of unions.
The Congressional purpose here is one of making the ordinary
evidence and rules of agency applicable to unions and employers
alike.'
Administration. Section 3 is concerned with administration. It
increases the membership of the NLRB from three to five mem-
bers. Here might be imputed the fine hand of a Republican Con-
gress seeking to make sure that, by adding members sympathetic
toward the amended law, the Act would be administered in the
manner contemplated by its framers. Section 3 (d) incorporates
an important change, for by its terms the Board's general counsel
is now selected by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate, instead of being appointed by the Board and subject
to its control, as he was under the Wagner Act. The general
counsel is now independent and has general supervision of all
Board attorneys except trial examiners and the legal assistants
of Board members. Another change abolishes the Review Sec-
tion of the NLRB; the Congress thought that an excess of judicial
functions had been delegated to this Section. The Committee
stated:
"... the Congressional purpose of having the Act administered by
a Board of several members rather than a single administrator has
been frustrated.... Congress intended the Board to function like a
Court... "20
Provision is made, however, for employment of attorneys as
19 Conference Report, H. R. RrP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Seas., 36 (1947).
20 See note 15 supra at 8-10.
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assistants to individual Board members in the preparation of
orders and decisions.
Section 6 is amended to make the Board subject to the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act"' in exercising its authority to make,
amend, and rescind its rules and regulations.
Rights of Employees. Section 7 of the Wagner Act guaranteed
employees the rights of organization and collective bargaining.
The amended Act repeats the section and adds a guarantee to indi-
vidual employees, as distinguished from labor organizations, of
the right to "refrain from any or all" activities and organiza-
tion, except as provided by Section 8 (a) (3) (discussed later').
The probable purpose of this language was prevention of union
coercion and domination of members.
Employer Unfair Labor Practices. Sections 7 and 8 of the Wag-
ner Act have sometimes been referred to as "Labor's Bill of
Rights." The fcrmer was declaratory of rights to be protected,
while the latter described some of the more important acts of
employers which were condemned as unfair labor practices and
for which a remedy was provided by the Act.
Section 8 retains all the provisions of the original, makes one
change, and adds an entire new group of unfair union practices.
In adding these prohibitions Congress is again attempting to
equalize the balance between labor and management and to elimi-
nate those factors which it thought had burdened and obstructed
commerce in the past.
Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act is now section 8 (a) (3) of
the LMRA. Discrimination by employers against employees in
regard to hire or tenure of employment is still prohibited. The
declaration that nothing in the Act shall prevent an employer
from making union-shop agreements (as distinguished from
"closed shop") with representative unions is preserved. Another
change comes in the addition of new conditions upon which this
right is dependent: the employer may make membership in the
2160 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. A. 1001 (Supp. 1947).
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representative union selected by his employees a condition of
tenure, but "permission [to make such a contract] ... is granted
only if, upon the most recent election held under .. . '(Section 9
(e)' . . . a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit in
question eligible to vote have authorized the union to make such
an agreement."22 Moreover, the employees must be allowed a
minimum of thirty days after employment in which to acquire
membership in the union. The new matter further commands the
employer not to discriminate against employees for failure to se-
cure union membership:
"(A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such member-
ship was not available to the employee on the same terms and condi-
tions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reason-
able grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated
for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the peri-
odic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership.""5
An explanation of this change and its provisions is found in
the Senate Committee Report2' where findings are made that, in
the five years preceding investigation, over 75 percent of all
union contracts made contained compulsory unionism features;
that many abuses arose because of these features; that these
abuses have aroused great public feeling against this type of ar-
rangement; and that 26 states had seen fit either to enact laws or
entertain legislative proposals outlawing such contracts. The
Congressional Report indicates awareness of the belief held by
labor leaders that such a federal law would allow individuals
to share in the benefits which labor has won while refusing to pay
a share of the cost. It manifests a legislative desire to protect the
rights of both parties, but, in addition, it manifests an opinion that
past instances of union monopolization of jobs, depriving man-
agement of its choice of employees, and the denial of the right
22 See note 15 supra at 41.
23 LMRA § 8(a) (3).
24 See note 15 supra at 6-7.
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to earn a living to minority groups, have made it imperative
that a change of some sort be made. The described changes are
designed to secure rights of the individual, at the same time
providing a method by which employers desiring to do so may
enter into union shop agreements.
A major change may be expected in the Board's treatment of
the problem of "dual unionism," a subject which was discussed
by NLRB General Counsel Denham at the last annual meeting of
the American Bar Association." Mr. Denham explained that the
old Act merely said that it would not be discriminatory to dis-
charge for failure to maintain union membership under a closed
shop or union-security contract. This made it possible for a union
having a closed shop contract to perpetuate itself by expelling
any member who attempted to switch to another union for the
purpose of changing bargaining representatives. The union could
request the employer to discharge the expelled member, threaten-
ing a strike upon refusal. The employer would be under eco-
nomic pressure to comply. In 1942 the doctrine of the Rutland
Court case" declared discharge by an employer with knowledge
that the reason for union expulsion had been "dual unionism" to
be an unfair labor practice, for which the employer would be
required to reinstate the employee with back pay. This did not
defeat the union practice, however, because the only penalty was
against the employer. A union could still threaten strikes with
impunity and the employer was forced to choose the lesser of
two evils and discharge the employee rather than risk the pro-
hibitive cost of a strike. It might then be several months before
the employee's case came up before the NLRB. Meanwhile the
employee was deprived of his income and, upon adverse decision,
the employer was deprived of his property in the amount of back
wages due without having received any labor in return, and with-
out fault on his part. The new Act precludes such coercion, pro-
25 N. L R. B. Release R-4, September 23,1947.
2o 44 N. L R. B. 1040 (1942).
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tecting both employee and employer from the union. An employer
is still liable if guilty of such discriminatory discharge of his
own volition, but Section 10 (c) expressly makes a union liable
for the amount of back pay if it is the procuring cause of such
a discharge.
This amendment is one of the most objectionable features of
the Taft-Hartley Act from the viewpoint of labor organizations
and their leaders. They complain of deprivation of all control
over their membership and of the protection given to those who
menace unions internally, such as informers, trouble makers,
and even Communists. An answer to this argument is that labor
has only itself to blame-without its unfair actions in the past
such a provision would not have been felt necessary by Con-
gress.
The status of complaints of unfair labor practices committed
before passage of the Taft-Hartley Bill deserves mention at this
point. A recent NLRB decision2 ' held that the Legislative history
of the LMRA indicates no congressional intent to absolve em-
ployers of liability for unfair practices committed prior to its
passage; therefore, the Board still has power to pass on such
cases. But in these instances if the union complaining of refusal
to bargain has not complied with filing and affidavit requirements
of the Act (discussed later) the employer will not be compelled
to bargain, since the practical effect would be to certify the union.
Another recent Board decision, under Section 8 (5) of the
NLRA, may properly be considered here. The Board held that it
would not effectuate the policies of the Act to order employers
to bargain with supervisory unions where refusal occurred prior
to amendment, since supervisors are excluded from the terms of
the LMRA. " Thus, a section which remains the same in the new
Act may be affected by changes in other sections so as to vary
its application.
2T Marshall & Bruce Co, Nashville Bindery Workers Union No. 83, International
Brotherhood of Bookbinders (AFL), 75 N. L R. B, No. 13 (1947).
2s See note 11 mupra.
1948]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Union Unfair Labor Practices. Section 8 (b) is entirely new.
No similar provisions have ever been contained in any previous
federal labor legislation. Here it is declared that six types of acts
by unions are unfair labor practices.
First: Restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7, or of employers in their selection
of management representatives for collective bargaining and ad-
justment of grievances with employees, is made an unfair prac-
tice. The Senate Committee said, with respect to the provision:
"We believe that freedom of the individual workman should be pro-
tected from duress by the union as well as duress by the employer."
(citing instances of union coercion and even physical violence against
employees) .29
As to coercion of employers, the Committee stated:
"Thus, a union or its responsible agents could not, without violat-
ing the law, coerce an employer into joining or resigning from an
employer association which negotiates labor contracts in behalf of its
members; also, this subsection would not permit a union to dictate
who shall represent an employer in settlement of employee grievances,
or to compel the removal of a personnel director or supervisor who
has been delegated the function of settling of grievances." 30
Second: To coerce or attempt to coerce discrimination under
union shop agreements for any reasons other than non-payment
of dues or fees, which must be uniform to all members of the
union, is also declared to be unfair. This lends force to Section
8 (a) (3) by giving the Board power to order unions to cease
and desist and to remedy injuries caused by unfair practices
thereunder. The main aim is, of course, prevention of discharge
because of dual unionism. Under these sections a union may
adopt whatever internal rules it may desire and may expel mem-
bers for reasons which it considers just, but neither it nor the
employer can cause a discriminatory discharge for such reasons.
29 See note 15 supra at 21.
80 Ibid.
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After expulsion the employee will still be entitled to his job
unless he has given lawful cause for losing it.
Third: It is an unfair practice for a union which is a repre-
sentative of employees under Section 9 (a) to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer. Here the obligation of unions is
raised to the same level as that imposed upon the employer by
the Wagner Act. It has been observed that this section is fair and
called for, because in the past unions have presumed that they
could demand, while employers were bound to bargain and make
counter-proposals. In many instances unions prepared contracts,
presented them to employers, and said, in effect, sign or take the
consequences. However, this was seemingly changed by the Times
Publishing case," which was decided prior to the 1947 amend-
ment, so that this section codifies the law existing at the time of
enactment.
Fourth: It is an unfair labor practice "... to engage in, or to
induce or encourage the employees of an employer to engage
in . . . " certain types of strikes, secondary boycotts, or jurisdic-
tional disputes. The major practices prohibited are those which
attempt to force an employer to cease doing business with other
employers or which attempt to force employers to recognize and
bargain with unions which have not been certified as employee
representatives by the NLRB. Also made unlawful are attempts
to force an employer to assign work to one union where he has
already assigned it to employees of another, unless the employer,
in refusing the union request, is failing to comply with an order
or certification of the Board. A proviso states that the right to
refrain from crossing picket lines is fully preserved to employees,
where the lines are set up in pursuance of a lawful strike.
Fifth: Section 8 (b) (5) makes it unfair for unions with union-
shop agreements, as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3), to charge
dues or fees which the NLRB finds are excessive or discrimina-
tory. The Board is given power to determine what is and what is
3172 N. L R. B., No. 12B (1947).
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not excessive under the circumstances. Among the factors to be
considered in this determination are the practices and customs
of unions in the particular industry and the wages currently
paid to the employees affected. General Counsel Denham ex-
pressed his understanding that what is excessive or discrimina-
tory will depend on the facts of each case. He stated that there is
no fixed criterion by which to judge initiation fees-that the de-
cision will depend upon (1) the industry, (2) the place which
the union occupies in the industry, and (3) the value of member-
ship in the particular union to its members. High fees may be
reasonable and just in some cases because of a long practice of
charging high fees and, or, because of the above three factors."
Whether or not a particular fee is or is not reasonable is within
the discretion of the NLRB, and while the General Counsel's
office is now separate and his views are not necessarily those of
the Board, it is reasonable to assume that its interpretation will
be substantially the same.
Sixth: Section 8 (b) (6), the last of the unfair union practices
specifically defined by the Act, will have a most important effect
in many fields of industry. It prohibits unions or their agents
from causing or attempting to cause employers to deliver, pay,
or agree to pay anything of value for services not performed or
not to be performed. It is designed to do away with "feather-
bedding" practices. The section will probably be construed nar-
rowly, applying to such situations as jurisdictional disputes
where a standby crew is imposed upon an employer, or instances
such as those where a musician's union has required the hiring
of an orchestra while recordings were played on radio broadcasts.
Where the extra personnel actually do some work the provision
probably will not be applied. The House Report states that the
purpose here is substantially the same as that of the Lea Act,"
32 For a full discussion we N. L I B. Release R4, September 23, 1947.
s 60 STAT. 427 (1946), 47 U. S. C. A. 506 (Supp. 1946).
[Vol. 2
WAGNER ACT AND TAFT-HARTLEY BILL
which was aimed at Petrillo's American Federation of Musicians
and did not apply to industry generally. The report goes on to say:
"... featherbedding [is a] ... problem which is becoming a more
and more serious menace to the productivity of our country and to
the manufacture of goods at a cost within the reach of millions of our
citizens." 34
Although no mention is made of vacation pay, retirement pay,
pay for rest periods, and similar arrangements, it seems logical
that such payments will not be held to fall under this section, since
they are so widely practiced and are approved by both labor and
management. Constitutionality of this section seems assured, since
the similar and more drastic provision of the Lea Act had been
upheld by the Supreme Court."
Free Speech. Section 8 (c) manifests a clear intent that the
right of free speech is not to be infringed by any of the provi.
sions of the Act. It provides:
".... the expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dis-
semination thereof ... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under ... this Act, if such expression contains no threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
Collective Bargaining. Section 8 (d) is entirely new. It seeks
to emphasize that the duty to bargain collectively is mutual to
both labor and management; that an essential part of this duty is
good faith; and that when the parties reach an agreement they
are then obligated to incorporate it into a written contract on
request of the other party. Nevertheless, it is plainly stated that
this provision is not to be construed as compelling any party to
agree to proposals or make concessions. After concesions and pro-
posals are made and agreements reached, it is required that the
parties conduct themselves according to ordinary standards of
fair dealing.
The section also imposes obligations where a collective con-
34 See note 6 supra at 25.
35 U. S. v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1947).
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tract is already in effect. The duty to bargain collectively there
includes (1) notice of desire to terminate or modify served on
the other party at least sixty days before expiration of the con-
tract; (2) an offer to meet and negotiate a new contract; (3)
notification of both the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Serv-
ice and appropriate local agencies within thirty days after giving
the notice required by (1), above; (4) continuation in full force
of all the terms of the existing contract for the full sixty-day
notice period without resort to strike or lockout. There follows a
provision that the duties enumerated shall be suspended if a
union, which is a party to such a contract, is superseded by the
intervening certification of another union by the NLRB, as-pro-
vided for by the Act. Any employee who strikes in violation of
this section loses his status as an employee for the purposes of
Sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Act, but regains his status when, and
if, he is re-employed. If, in an existing contract, the notice period
is longer than sixty days this stipulated period is not suspended;
however, violation of it woild not be an unfair practice, so long
as the sixty-day notice required by the Act is given."
The opinion has been expressed that the requirement of mutual
good faith in collective bargaining is the outstanding feature of
the entire 1947 Amendment, and that, if conscientiously followed
by all parties, it will be more effective than any other single factor
in eliminating industrial friction and strife.
Exclusive Representation. Section 9 (a) is incorporated in the
Taft-Hartley Act with some additions. The old version provided
that the representative (union) selected by the majority of em-
ployees composing any appropriate bargaining unit should be the
exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit, with
the exception that any employee or group might at any time pre-
sent grievances to the employer. The amendment states that these
employees shall have the additional right to have grievances
adjusted without intervention by the bargaining representative, so
3 1See note 15 supra at 24.
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long as the bargaining representative is given opportunity to be
present at the time of adjustment. The Senate Committee was of
the opinion that Labor Board decisions had not given full effect
to Section 9 (a), and the purpose of this change is to clarify and
show that the individual employee's right to present his grievance
exists independently of any right which the union may have. The
Committee indicated that the employee will not be required, as
Board decisions have held, to consult the union at each and every
stage of negotiations; he may conduct his business with his em-
ployer in private if he so wishes, just so long as the agent of the
bargaining representative is allowed to be present at the settle-
ment.
Bargaining Unit. Section 9 (b) gives the Board power to decide
what the appropriate bargaining unit shall be in each case-craft,
plant, or employer unit, or a subdivision thereof-whichever will
most effectively carry out the provisions of the Act. There are,
however, several qualifications and limitations placed on this
power. No unit shall be appropriate which contains both profes-
sional and non-professional employees unless a majority of the
professionals in the unit vote against separate representation.
This, in effect, creates a presumption that professional employees
wish to be represented by a separate union of their own. The
Board may not decide that any craft unit is inappropriate on the
ground of a prior Board decision determining that a different
unit was appropriate unless a majority of the members of the
craft unit vote against separate representation. No unit shall be
appropriate which has as members both guards, employed to
enforce rules for the protection or safety of property or persons
on the employer's premises, and other categories of employees;
and the Board is precluded from certifying as a representative
any union which has such a membership or is affiliated, either di-
rectly or indirectly, with any organization which admits both
guards and other employees.
At congressional hearings representatives of various profes-
22 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2
sional associations appeared and complained of occasions where
the Board had included members of these professions in the same
units with production, maintenance, or clerical employees. The
testimony showed the interests and problems of professional peo-
ple to be generally dissimilar to those of other groups covered.
Because of the relatively small number of the former, their views
are seldom reflected in agreements to which they are subjected
when included in units with non-professional personnel. Now
professionals may form separate units and make their own agree-
ments. The Board is forbidden to retain these persons in their
former units against their will on the basis of previous determina-
tions and must now consider the actual wishes of this important
class of employees.3"
By separating plant guards from other groups of employees
the amendment reverses the position of the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp." Now personnel em-
ployed to enforce rules for the protection of an employer's prop-
erty and the safety of persons on his premises are removed from
the influence of organizations composed of the rank and file. It
would seem only just that employers be accorded the right of
having as their custodians persons who are not constantly find-
ing conflict in their loyalties, being torn between the orders of
their union leaders and duty toward employers.
In line with the Act, a Circuit Court of Appeals recently refused
to require an employer to bargain with a union which claimed
to represent guards and other members employed in different
capacities.' This decision was reached despite a mandate from
the Supreme Court directing that the Board order be enforced.
The mandate had been issued prior to passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act, and the court felt that its decision should be based on the
law at the time of rendition, not as the law previously existed.
37 Id. at 11, 12.
38331 U.S. 416 (1947).
39 N. L. R. B. v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 165 F. (2d) 659 (C. C. A. 7th, 1947).
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In another case," decided by the NLRB, a union which already
represented production and maintenance employees petitioned
seeking to represent timekeepers and other clerical workers em-
ployed in the factory as a part of either a production and mainte-
nance unit, or as a separate unit. The employer protested, attempt-
ing to analogize under the plant guard provision that such
representation was inappropriate. The Board brushed this con-
tention aside, saying that Congress would have expressly so stated
had it intended to include clerical workers in such a special
category.
In still another decision the Board held that foremen should
be excluded from bargaining units, since they are not "em-
ployees" within the meaning of the Act. 1
These cases seem to indicate that this section is being enforced
according to its terms.
Procedure for the determination of bargaining representatives
is substantially changed by section 9 (c). The Board must direct
an election by secret ballot whenever a petition for certification
is properly filed by either an employer or a union, if the Board
finds that a question affecting commerce exists. No distinction is
made because of the identity of the petitioning party, and where
a valid election has been held within the preceding twelve months,
no new election may be ordered. Employees on strike and not
eligible for reinstatement will not be allowed to vote. The twelve
month provision does not, however, prevent the Board from per-
mitting consent elections.
These changes were effected because Congress felt that present
Board rules discriminated against employers and made collective
bargaining a "one-way street."" Once more an intent to clarify
the Wagner Act is shown, after a finding that the original was in-
40 Art Metal Construction Co., International Assn. of Machinists, 75 N. L. R. B., No.
11 (1947).
41 Marshall & Bruce Co., Nashville Bindery Workers Union No. 83, International
Brotherhood of Bookbinders (AFL), 75 N. L R. B., No. 13 (1947).
42 See note 15 supra at 10.11.
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adequate to create equality and justice between labor and manage-
ment. As yet the Board has not construed this portion of the new
Act.
Votes on Union Shop. The addition of Section 9 (e) establishes
procedure for making union-shop agreements. Upon filing of a
petition by a union alleging that thirty percent or more of the em-
ployees in a unit wish to authorize a union-shop contract, the
Board must conduct an election by secret ballot. Authority given
by these employees to make such a contract may be revoked in
precisely the same manner that it is granted, upon the filing of a
petition. In neither case may an election be held where there has
been a valid election within the past twelve months.
Conditions Precedent to Union Rights. Section 9 (f) precludes
Board hearings of petitions or complaints submitted by a labor
organization unless both the specific union and its national af-
filiates file certain information with the Secretary of Labor. In-
cluded are copies of union constitutions and by-laws, the names,
titles, compensation and allowances of principal officers and
agents, the manner in which these officials were selected, initiation
fees and dues, and a detailed report as to procedure followed in
respect to membership, elections, meetings, assessments, fines,
authorization for bargaining demands, disbursements, strikes,
ratification of contracts, audits, benefit plans, and expulsion of
members. In addition, the union must show that it has filed fi-
nancial statements with the Secretary of Labor and has furnished
each of its members with a copy of that statement. A glance at these
requirements will show that they are designed to compel union
leaders to deal properly with organization funds, secure proper
authorization from the membership for bargaining demands, and
to protect generally against the possibility of racketeering.
Section 9 (g) requires unions and any organizations of which
they are affiliates to file annually with the Secretary information
which will bring documents filed originally under the preceding
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sub-section up to date. This filing is a condition precedent to en-
joyment of the right to petition for representation and to' file com-
plaints with the NLRB.
A recent Board decision on the effect of Sections 9 (f), (g),
and (h) is of importance.'" The Board granted the petition of
Local No. 1215, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers, for certification, the union having complied with filing and
affidavit requirements. Its affiliate, the AFL, had failed to comply
with these requirements. The Board held that Sections 9 (f) and
(g) do not apply to parent organizations such as the AFL and
the CIO in cases of this type. Congress ". . . is deemed to have
used words in the sense in which they are understood by those
who daily deal with the subject.'"' The Board concluded that the
AFL and CIO are not "national or international labor organiza-
tions" as those words are understood in the usage of writers on
the subject of labor. As another ground the decision stated that
to hold otherwise would not be the most practical means of effec-
tuating the policies of the Act. The Board said that the purpose
of Section 9 (h) is to eliminate Communist influence from the
labor movement and that if the CIO and the AFL were required
to comply with these three Sections, 9 (f), (g), and (h), the
refusal of one officer of the parent would prevent any of the unions
making up these federations from using the facilities of the Act.
The effect of such a result would be to remove the incentive
which the Act gives to the subordinate unions to eliminate Com-
munists, and the Board felt that this would be playing directly
into Communist hands. The members stated: "We cannot believe
that Congress intended any such paradoxical result."' 5 This was
a four to one decision, Member Gray dissenting on the ground that
the AFL and CIO obviously come within the terms "national or
43 Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc., Radio Station WARL, "Al Union No. 1215,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL), 75 N. L R. B., No. 2, 1 C. C. H.




international labor organizations" and that the majority of the
Board departed from its judicial function in considering the ques-
tion in terms of the most practical approach to ridding the labor
movement of Communists.
While the majority decision may be the most practical method
of making the rights granted under the Act available to unions
more quickly, there may be much merit in the dissent. It might
very well be that Congress intended that such rights be denied
to all subordinate unions until the parent complied and that com-
pliance be compelled through pressure on the AFL and CIO from
within. It seems clear that these two networks themselves will have
no right to the facilities of the Act without compliance, even in
the light of the Board's interpretation here."
In a case wherein an employer was found to have refused to
bargain with the complaining union prior to the passage of the
LMRA, the Board ruled unanimously that it still had power to
afford a remedy to the union for the unfair practice, notwith-
standing union failure, since passage, to comply with filing and
affidavit requirements. However, the Board ruled also, by a three
to two decision, that the exercise of this power was within its
discretion and that it would not effectuate the basic policy of
Congress to require the employer to bargain, since the Board
would not have the power to certify the union. An order was issued
directing the employer to bargain, contingent upon the union's
compliance with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) within thirty days."
Affidavits. Section 9 (h) prohibits, in the same manner as sub-
sections (f) and (g), the processing of petitions for election, peti-
tions for union-shop referendums, or complaints of unfair labor
practices unless the union has filed, either contemporaneously or
within the past twelve months, non-Communist affidavits executed
by each officer or both the petitioning union and any national or
46 N. L. R. B. Release R-4, September 23, 1947.
47 Marshall & Bruce Co., Nashville Bindery Workers Union No. 83, International
Brotherhood of Bookbinders (AFL), 75 N. L R. B., No. 13 (1947).
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international affiliate."8 False affidavits are subject to penalty as
prescribed by Section 35 (a) of the United States Criminal Code.
Affidavits must be renewed in the same manner as the matters
described under subsections (f) and (g).
Prevention of Unfair Practices. Section 10 deals with methods
of enforcement of the Act and prescribes the rules of evidence
to be used by both the Board and courts.
Section 10 (a) of the Wagner Act gave the NLRB exclusive
jurisdiction for the prevention of unfair labor practices. The
Board is now empowered to delegate such jurisdiction to any
state or territorial agency except where the applicable section
of state law conflicts with corresponding portions of this Act or
where the dispute concerns certain important basic industries
and is not "predominantly local in character." As a result, a
host of minor disputes may be removed to local agencies, and
the Board's load may be so lightened that it may investigate
important matters more thoroughly and expeditiously.
Complaints-Hearings-Evidence-Limitations. Section 10 (b) for-
merly provided for issuance of complaints by the Board, service
on offenders, hearings, amendments, and evidence. This is con-
tinued with one change and one addition.
A six-months period of limitation is prescribed beyond which
no charge of unfair practice may be filed. This provision will pre-
vent many dilatory filings, but still will be possible for the Board
to hear complaints which involve what it considers continuing
violations. However, in such a case, damages would be limited
to those incurred subsequent to a time six months prior to filing
of the charge and service on the violator. Thus, illegally dis-
charged employees cannot be awarded back pay for long periods,
as they have been in the past.
Under the Wagner Act the rules of evidence were not control-
ling. The law now requires that the rules applied in district courts
of the United States be applied as far as practicable. The House
4S Oil Workers International Union v. Elliot, 73 F. Supp. 942 (N. D. Tex. 1947).
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Committee declared that Supreme Court decisions"' ". . . by mak-
ing the Board in effect its own Supreme Court as far as findings
of fact are concerned, renders the courts all but powerless to
correct the Board's abuses." The Committee found that under
the old law "... anything more than a 'modicum', a 'scintilla'
of evidence" was enough. The Committee went on to say:
".... this resulted in what the courts have described as 'shocking
injustices' in the Board's rulings, 'asinine reasoning by the Board,
findings 'overwhelmingly opposed by the evidence', ... 'remarkable
discrimination' on the part of the Board .... The Board's expertness
is largely theoretic .... Requiring the Board to rest its rulings upon
facts, not inferences, conjectures, backgrounds, imponderables, and
assumed expertness will correct abuses under the Act."50
Since legal rules of evidence are to be applied only so far as
practicable, Board procedure may not be changed very greatly.
But this change, in connection with other changes in Section 10,
will probably have considerable effect on the extent to which
Board decisions may be judicially reviewed.
On August 21, 1947, NLRB field officers were directed to dis-
miss all unfair labor practice charges unless the charging party
produced within seventy-two hours both (1) sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case and (2) the witnesses whose testimony
would be relied on to establish the alleged violations. Exceptions
were made where witnesses were located a substantial distance
from the regional office."' Such requirements will undoubtedly
do much to speed up the processing of complaints and discour-
age the filing of those which are not well founded.
Preponderance of Evidence Test. Section 10 (c) of the 1935
Act authorized the Board to issue cease and desist orders and
require affirmative remedial action if, "upon all the testimony,"
it concluded that the person complained of had been guilty of an
unfair practice. The Board is now required to find "upon the
49 Such as Consolidated Edison v. N. L R. B., 307 U. S. 197 (1938).
50 See note 6 supra at 40-41.
51 N. L R. B. Release R-6246, August 21, 1947.
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right in certain cases, and declared that nothing in the Act shall
be construed to affect the limitations or qualifications on the
right to strike.
Supervisors and State Closed-Shop Laws. Section 14 is new.
Subsection (a) states that nothing in the Act shall prevent super-
visors from joining or remaining members of unions, but declares
that no employer may be compelled to bargain collectively with
supervisors under either state, local, or federal laws.
Section 14 (b) declares that nothing in the Act shall be con-
strued as authorizing union-shop agreements in states or terri-
tories which have laws prohibiting such contracts. It is made clear
that, although federal law permits union shops, such arrangements
may be outlawed by the legislature of any state or territory.
THE LMRA, 1947
The foregoing changes in the NLRB, 1935, are all accom-
plished by Title I of the LMRA. The remaining titles of the new
Act supplement Title I, and a comparison of the two laws is not
complete without an examination of these titles. Only the out-
standing features of the remainder of the Act will be discussed.
Mediation and Conciliation. Because some of our legislators
considered that the old Conciliation Service, which functioned
under the Department of Labor, had been an "advocate of the
labor side of controversies, ' '.. this agency was abolished. Section
203 creates an entirely new and independent agency, the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, which is not in any way sub-
ject to the authority of the Secretary of Labor. It is headed by a
director, appointed by the President, who has broad powers as
to administration and organization. Nowhere in the Act are means
afforded by which this service may be forced upon parties against
their will, and in no way can parties be forced to submit to arbi-
tration. The agency is merely an available government facility to
assist disputants in the voluntary settlement of their differences.
National Labor-Management Panel. The value of the old Labor-
This statement was made in Senate debaft m these sections.
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Jurisdictional Disputes. Section 10 (k) gives the Board cog-
nizance of disputes arising under Section 8 (b) (4) (D) (juris-
dictional disputes), unless the strike is settled between the parties
within ten days after issuance of a complaint. This, in effect,
provides for compulsory arbitration in such cases, although the
law is not couched in such terms. Board powers here are not to
be limited by any provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.5"
Mandatory Injunctions. By Section 10 (1), where a charge is
filed under Section 8 (b) (A), (B), (C), or, in some cases, (D),
and where the investigating officer of the NLRB has reasonable
cause to believe that such charge is true, it is mandatory that such
officer apply to the appropriate district court for injunctive relief.
This section seems to authorize both injunctions and temporary
restraining orders; however, it provides that court orders are to
be limited to five days duration, in which time notice shall be
served on the union involved. At the expiration of the five day
period a hearing is to be held and, where it appears to the court
that substantial irreparable injury will otherwise result, an in-
junction may be issued. Since notice is a necessary prerequisite
to a temporary injunction, it seems that only restraining orders
may be issued under the procedure outlined by the Act.
Complaints of these unfair practices are given priority over
all proceedings not of this type. This seems designed to prevent
the injustices caused in the past by unwieldly Board procedures
and to give precedence to those practices considered most burden-
some and dangerous to the free flow of commerce. It is to be
noted that this provision is carefully qualified so as to protect
employers from irreparable injury and at the same time prevent
misuse of such orders to the detriment of labor.
Right to Strike. The Wagner Act unqualifiedly declared that
none of its provisions should in any way diminish or interfere
with the right to strike. The amendment (Section 13) makes an
exception of the new provisions which specifically prohibit the
53 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. H 101-115 (1947).
1948]
SOUTHIWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
10 (f) grant to United States district and circuit courts jurisdic-
tion to review NLRB decisions and to make such decrees as they
find just, either enforcing, modifying, or setting aside final Board
orders. Review may be had on a petition for enforcement by the
Board or on a petition by "any person aggrieved" as the result
of a final Board order.
These sections were contained in the Wagner Act, and they pro-
vided that ". .. the findings of the Board as to facts, if supported
by the evidence, [shall] be ...conclusive." This provision now
reads: ". .. the findings of the Board ... if supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be con-
clusive." (Italics supplied). The change is intended, in connec-
tion with Sections 10 (b) and 10 (c), to eliminate the abuses
considered under those sections. An avenue is opened here for
more court reversals of Board decisions based on controverted
questions of fact. A duty is placed upon the courts to determine
whether the Board has properly weighed the evidence and ob-
served the other two provisions. While it is impossible to predict
the actual effect which these three changes will have upon future
litigation, there is much room for modification of existing law.
Temporary Relief. Under the Wagner Act the Board could not
apply to the courts for temporary injunctions or restraining orders
until it had issued a final order. Because substantial injury was
caused at times by lengthy hearings and investigation, the Taft-
Hartley Act, by Section 10 (j), empowers the NLRB to seek
interim relief in district courts at the time the complaint of an
unfair practice is filed. General Counsel Denham understands
congressional intent here to be that injunctions be requested only
in cases of emergency, where loss, damage, or jeopardy to the
safety or welfare of a large segment of the public will result
if equitable relief is not obtained. He has stated further that the
Act does not protect private rights unless they are incidental to
protection of the public at large.'2
52N. L I. B. Release R-4, September 23, 1947.
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preponderance of the testimony" that such violation was com-
mitted. This is a change emphasizing that the Board is a quasi-
judicial body. Section 10 (b) will prevent the introduction of
much evidence, not admissible in courts of law or equity, which
has hitherto been allowed by the Board. Section 10 (c) will re-
quire the Board to set forth the evidence upon which it relies in
reaching conclusions and the reasons which persuade it to rely
upon certain testimony and disbelieve or consider inapplicable
other evidence and testimony. The Board must now weigh the
evidence-the procedure followed by courts in making decisions.
Such decisions should be more fair and just than some rendered
in the past and should command an increased respect for the
Board.
Reinstatement and Back Pay. Section 10 embodies another of
the equalizing provisions of the Act. Section 10 (e) provides
that where a Board order directs reinstatement and back pay,
either the employer or the union, whichever is responsible for
the discrimination, shall be required to pay the wronged individ-
ual. This section is directly related to Section 8 (b) (2), which
prohibits unions from coercing discriminatory discharges. Sec-
tion 10 (c) furnishes a basis for remedy of all violations of Sec-
tion 8 (b).
Orders and Exceptions. Another change requires the Board to
apply the same regulations and rules of decision with respect to
violations of Sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (2), regardless of
whether or not the union concerned is affiliated with a national
or international organization. The exact effect of this change is
not clear. Under the Wagner Act the NLRB treated company-
dominated unions differently from company-formed (but inde-
pendent) unions. The former were disestablished as bargaining
representatives, while a less drastic remedy was applied to the
latter. The new Act may compel equal treatment of both types of
organizations.
Judicial Review-Substantial Evidence. Sections 10 (e) and
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Management Committee is recognized by the formation of a new
panel of twelve men. All are to be chosen by the President, six
each from the outstanding leaders in the fields of management
and of labor. Their function is to advise the Director of the Medi-
ation and Conciliation Service, at his request.
National Emergencies. Sections 206-210 are an innovation in
their treatment of industrial disputes. They are designed to pro-
tect the public from industry-wide strikes affecting interstate com-
merce. Whenever the President is of the opinion that a strike or
threatened strike or lockout affecting an entire industry (or sub-
stantial part thereof) will endanger the national health or safety,
he may appoint a board of inquiry. It shall have the power to
conduct hearings anywhere in the United States and to compel
the appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence. The
Board shall make a report to the President, which he shall make
public, and which shall include a statement of the facts and each
party's position, but shall not contain any recommendations.
Upon receipt the President may direct the Attorney General to
petition the appropriate district court for an injunction. Federal
district courts are granted jurisdiction to issue such injunctions,
notwithstanding any provisions of the Judicial Code, if they find
that a threatened or actual strike or lockout will imperil national
health or safety if allowed to continue.
Upon issuance of any injunction the President must reconvene
his board of inquiry which shall, at the end of a sixty-day period
(unless settlement is effected sooner), make a report similar to
their original one but containing, in addition, a statement of the
progress which has been made. This report shall also be made
public. After the end of the sixty-day period it is mandatory that
the NLRB, within fifteen days, conduct a secret ballot election
among the employees involved to determine their acceptance or
rejection of the employer's last offer of settlement. Results of
this election must be certified to the Attorney General within
1948]
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five days, who must thereupon move that the court dissolve the
injunction. The granting of such motion is mandatory.
These provisions furnish a means by which a major strike or
lockout may be prevented for a period of nearly five months. The
sections just discussed cover eighty days, and motion for injunc-
tion could be brought by the Attorney General just at the end of
the sixty-day strike notice period required under union contracts
by Section 8 (d) of the amended NLRA. The constitutionality of
this provision was questioned in congressional debate and will
almost certainly be litigated. Senator Taft admitted the existence
of such question but believed that the courts would uphold the law
as valid. In view of the extent to which federal power over inter-
state commerce has been upheld in the past, it would seem that
the Supreme Court should find no difficulty in holding this sec-
tion constitutional.
Suits By and Against Unions. In Section 301 Congress removes
many of the difficulties which have prevented suits against unions.
A union may now either sue or be sued as a legal entity. Juris-
diction is conferred upon the district court having jurisdiction of
the parties, and service may be perfected upon the proper officer
or agent of the union in his capacity as such. This removed an
almost insurmountable difficulty previously existing in states
where service was required on each and every union member.
Both employers and unions are now bound by the acts of their
agents.
Employer Support--Check.Off. Section 302 makes illegal vol-
untary or coerced support of unions by employers. "Check-off"
of union dues is now allowed only where each employee has
executed and delivered a written assignment to the employer,
authorizing check-off deductions. In addition, very stringent con-
ditions are placed upon employer contributions to, and union ad-
ministration of, employee trust funds.
Unlawful Strikes and Boycotts-Damages. Section 303 (a)
makes it unlawful for unions to engage in or encourage any of the
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strikes or boycotts declared illegal by Section 8 (b) (4). Unions
are made liable for damages and costs incurred as a result of their
violations of the sections. A California superior court has upheld
the constitutionality of Section 303."
Political Contributions and Expenditures by labor organiza-
tions are outlawed by Section 304, which amends Section 313
of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. 8
Congressional Investigation of Labor Problems is provided for
by Title IV. A Congressional "Joint Committee on Labor Man-
agement Relations" is created which is to study, among others,
enumerated subjects of broad scope and make a report to Con-
gress not later than March 15, 1948. A final report must be ren-
dered not later than January 2, 1949. This shows Congress' rec-
ognition that the present law has room for improvement and that
it will not solve all the problems which may arise. The reports
of this committee should provide a basis for future intelligent
legislation and amendment of the present Act.
Title V defines the terms "industry affecting commerce" and
"strike," and adopts most of the definitions of the amended
NLRA.
CONCLUSION
In recapitulation, what has Congress done? After years of
upheaval, during which few days passed without mention of a
labor dispute in the nation's press, and after the force of public
opinion brought itself to bear in the last congressional elections,
our lawmakers were brought to the realization that an earnest
effort to find a remedy must be made. The changes discussed
above were the result.
Whether the Act is good or bad is not to be pondered here.
These laws are not expected to afford a complete cure for our
labor troubles, but they are believed to be well designed to take
55 Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom v. Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Workers Union (Calif.
Super. Ct., Fresno Co), 13 C. C. H. L. .s.C.s. No. 64,051 (1947).
56 43 STAr. 1070 (1925), 2 U. S. C. A. §§ 241-256 (Supp. 1947).
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us a long way down that path. A method has been set up by which
Congress may keep step with labor developments under the Act.
When a provision seems deficient, too stringent, or to be operating
wrongfully or in an impractical manner, the new Labor Commit-
tee may suggest a remedy, which Congress may use to correct its
laws. If the parties concerned follow the spirit of the Act, deal
in good faith, and respect the rights of others, the new National
Labor Relations Act and the other portions of the Taft-Hartley
Act may well be a tremendous step leading to permanent indus-
trial peace.
W. Lewis Perryman, Jr.
